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How Income Contingent Loans could affect Return to Higher 
Education: a microsimulation of the French Case 
 
 








The paper assesses the implementation of income contingent loan schemes for higher 
education (ICL) in an institutional context characterized by two main features: (i) a former 
tuition free system and (ii) a great heterogeneity in tertiary education’s diplomas quality and 
cost, which impacts the individual career paths. In this particular case, ICL implementation 
leads to a trade-off between increasing ‘career’ equity in terms of collective public spending 
versus individual gains and widening low education traps by reducing the economic 
incentives to pursue a tertiary education curriculum. Based on a dynamic microsimulation 
model we propose an ex ante evaluation of the enlargement of low education traps induced by 
the implementation of different ICL designs in France. We conclude that the risk of low 








The Income Contingent Loans (ICL) schemes have been implemented in some countries 
-noteworthy Australia and New-Zealand- mainly to develop higher education financial 
resources and to downsize credit shortage for low income families’ students. In an ICL 
financing scheme, tuition fees must be paid, but students can borrow from the State. 
Collecting the debt depends on the borrower capacity to pay back over her life course: above 
a certain income threshold, the borrower is supposed to pay back each year a fixed part of her 
income until her loan is recovered.  
Financing higher education by ICL has been thoroughly discussed in education economics –
for a review, see Chapman (2006a). Insofar as individuals finance their own higher education, 
ICL can be associated to a reduction in higher education subsid ies and the correspond ing tax 
burden; it then reduces the income regressivity of a no-charge education system; it can also 
diminish the problems generated by credit market failures; at last it can play a role in favour 
of the promotion of some career choices that are not well paid but socially desirable. 
Evidences on the practical consequences of implementing ICL are also documented in some 
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countries with different institutional designs and higher education problems they face –
Chapman and Ryan (2003), Chapman (2006a). This paper assesses the question of ICL 
implementation in a particular case: the case of countries with (1) existing tuition-free system 
and (2) great heterogeneity in tertiary education’s diplomas’ quality and cost, which impacts 
the individuals’ career paths. We discuss the ICL implementation in this case with an ex ante 
evaluation for France, based on a dynamic microsimulation model.  
Implementing ICL may have various consequences. First, implemented in a tuition-free 
system, it implies a reduction in the returns and a reduction in the gap between the individual 
gains and the collective cost of a degree. We focus on this aspect when we refer to the 
problem of equity. Second, the reduction in return may affect the individual decision to 
engage in tertiary education and the choice of the diploma. We do not assess directly this 
question; however we analyse the implication of ICL implementation on the distribution of 
expected gains. We focus on this aspect when we refer to the potential widening of low 
education trap. 
The second section identifies the particular issue we asses in regard to the previous literature 
on ICL. We discuss the idea that in our particular case, implementing ICL leads to a trade-off 
between equity and the returns to higher education. Insofar as high enrolment rates in higher 
education are linked to the tuition-free system, increasing tuition costs to a level closer to the 
real education costs could lead to incentive problems. In some countries - like Australia– 
implementing ICL did not affect enrolment rates in tertiary education. However in countries 
with great heterogeneity in higher education costs for similar degrees –like France- the 
incentives for higher education enrolment could be substantially changed by introducing an 
ICL scheme, then potentially widening low education traps. In the third section, we discuss 
the way a dynamic microsimulation model tackling with the heterogeneity of life course 
considering diploma could assess this problem.  Following this methodology, one can produce 
an ex ante evaluation of the impact of implementing an ICL schemes on the internal rate of 
return to higher education. We present a dynamic microsimulation model which illustrates the 
main features of the French case: especially career diversity considering diploma and the 
transfers’ system. In a fourth section, we present the results of the simulation for different ICL 
schemes and their potential impact on internal rates of return. We then discuss the risk of 
enlarging low education traps in implementing ICL. 
 
2. Career Equity and Low Education Traps: is there a trade-off? 
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In this section, we identify key concepts to evaluate ICL implementation in France.We 
discuss the risk of enlarging low education traps when implementing an ICL system 
consistent with higher education’s real costs in a formerly tuition-free tertiary education 
system. Enlargement of low education traps could then be defined as the individual choice of 
not completing tertiary education because of changes in the money incentives to enter higher 
education. 
In a first sub-section, we review the equity problem of ICL implementation and focus on what 
we identify as the career equity issue. We argue that the quantification of the trade-off 
between equity and low education traps remains a crucial problem which is context related. 
In a second sub-section, we point out the France as a polar case characterized by a 
concentration of higher education subsidies and a related differentiation of individual career. 
In this country, considering the actual higher education framework, implementing a higher 
education financing arrangement with a higher level of equity could lead to reduced returns to 
higher education. 
 
2.1. Income Contingent Loan implementation: learning from international comparisons 
There are several motivations to implement ICL scheme for higher education: (i) generalize a 
financial arrangement less costly than scholarship, (ii) increase enrolment rate of students 
with poor family background, (iii) enable individuals to access not well paid careers which 
however produce wide positive externality, (iv) increase resources for higher education, (v) 
implement a financial arrangement more progressive with income –see Chapman (2006b) for 
a review. The relative importance of these motivations differ according to countries and the 
problems their educational system faces. For instance the need of resources for higher 
education, the will to downsize the importance of default protection in the repayment of a 
loan, and the will to decrease the regressivity of a no-charge system seem important 
objectives considered for the launching of ICL schemes in Australia and New Zealand. In the 
United States, it is the problem of conventional loan repayments and their implication for 
career choices which seems to have been central in the decision of implementing an ICL 
scheme -Chapman (2006a). In our particular case –e.g. tuition-free higher educational system 
with a great heterogeneity in tertiary education’s diplomas real cost –the scope of the benefits 
of an ICL implementation need to be precisely defined.  
In a first hand, the ICL scheme could increase resources for higher education. Insofar as 
higher educational costs are already subsidized –e.g. financed by taxes-, the increase in 
resources is linked to the collection of the debt over the life course. This means that the 
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increase in resources available is a long term objective of the ICL implementation. Moreover, 
without a reform of the financial arrangements between Universities and State, implementing 
an ICL scheme collected by tax administration has no direct effect on Universities financial 
resources. We do not focus on this particular point. 
In a second hand, the ICL scheme could increase equity. From an income analysis point of 
view, a tuition free higher education system is regressive insofar as higher education 
enrolment is linked to family income. This first income-regressive effect could be called the 
‘family’ effect. It was expected to be small in a tuition-free higher education system –the 
actual income-regressive ‘family’ effect could remain in a no charge system, as suggested by 
the Australian debates in the 80’s (Chapman, 2006b). This first income-regressive ‘family’ 
effect is reinforced by an income-regressive ‘career’ effect for higher educated workers due to 
the wage premium attached to their diploma. If the differential wage premium of the different 
diplomas is linked to the real teaching costs, an ICL scheme which charges the students 
according to their real teaching costs is supposed to reduce the ‘career’ income-regressive 
effect of higher education.  
Considering the particular case of a no-charge higher education system with a great 
heterogeneity in tertiary education costs, the main goal of implementing an ICL scheme could 
be to reduce the ‘career’ income regressive effect. 
However, a main drawback of implementing ICL in a tuition-free system is that it reduces 
return to higher education. The students enrolled in higher education have to pay back their 
education costs –or a part of it- over their life course. This change increases equity. Indeed, in 
the former system, the training cost was entirely paid by the State, whereas the diploma 
benefits are mainly captured by the former student –nevertheless a part of this wage premium 
is paid back to the State by means of progressive taxes and some benefits can be collective 
through externalities. In the new situation the diploma cost is paid by the State and the former 
student. Implementing ICL scheme could then produce low education traps if the net wage 
premium for higher education is substantially reduced. The incentive to complete a higher 
education degree is downsized. With imperfect information, this effect could counter-balance 
the effect of increasing ‘career’ equity in so far as the risk of having high educated poor 
careers could only be supported by students from higher income families. Low education 
traps could then be defined as a global incentives’ scheme which favours the choice of not 
pursuing tertiary education.     
Few evaluations which assess the problem of low education traps for poor background 
individuals linked to ICL implementation are available. They concern mainly the Australian 
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and the New Zealand cases which are generally considered as successes. The New Zealand  
case is the most far away from the case we assess in this paper, because ICL scheme was 
implemented in a higher education system with already existing fees for higher education. 
However, the available evaluations point out some interesting results reported in Chapman 
(2006a). For instance, Maani and Warner (2000) note a decrease in Maoris’ enrolment in 
higher education following the ICL implementation –historically in this country the Maoris 
constitute an ethnic group with relatively poor background. However, LaRocque (2005) 
considering the period after the 2000’s reform which tends to introduce more income 
progressive measures in the ICL scheme finds an increase in the Maoris’ enrolment.  
The Australian experience is closer to the case we assess insofar as ICL schemes were 
implemented in a tuition-free higher education system. The available evaluation tends to show 
that there is no effect on poor background individuals enrolment rate in higher education: 
Andrew (1999), Long et al. (1999), Marks et al. (2000), Chapman and Ryan (2002) found no 
evidence in this perspective, whereas Aungles et al.  (2002) notes a decrease in poor 
background individuals enrolment rate after 1996 ICL’s reform, but the robustness of the 
result is questioned  –see Chapman (2006a) for a comment. 
When one considers implemented ICL policies, there is a tendency to link real higher 
education cost and ICL schemes, but it remains relatively underdeveloped. For instance, in 
Australia, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) changes of 1996 could be 
interpreted as a reform in this way. The HECS is an ICL scheme that was launched in 1989 
with a uniform charge whatever is the subject area of the student. The 1996’s reform 
introduces three differentiated charges by broad subject area. According to Chapman (1998), 
this differential charge reform transformed the Australian higher education system into a 
hybrid model: this new arrangement goes further in closing the gap between fees and costs, 
but it is not actually consistent with a pure cost recovery model. Moreover, from a European 
point of view, considering the Lisbon Strategy and its related guidelines for education, 
introducing higher fees for scientific diploma seems not consistent with the so-called 
‘Education and Training 2010’ guidelines: one of the main goal is to increase recruitment in 
scientific and technical studies –see for instance Commission of the European Communities 
(2005).  
From a more general point a view, ICL is a tool to develop ‘career’ equity; it reduces the gap 
between individual costs and individual return to education over the life course. In this regard, 
the few existing experiments are not ‘purely’ transferable, because one needs to identify the 
degree of polarization of higher education subsidies in the national system, as well as the 
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distribution of career under a given national socio-fiscal regime. The question of how far 
national policy can go in reducing income-regressive ‘career’ effect of higher education 
without creating low education traps remains a crucial problem in the discussion of ICL 
implementation, and more generally in promoting the ICL principle. This question is context 
related. 
 
2.2. Equity and the  diversity in Higher Education Cost: The French Case 
Considering the question of developing ‘career’ equity with ICL in a higher education tuition-
free system, France is interesting when one considers the great heterogeneity of tertiary 
education’s paths and of their corresponding costs. This heterogene ity goes beyond the 
evidence that scientific diplomas are generally more costly than other diplomas, and relates to 
the different institutions in charge of higher education paths and their place in the educational 
system.  
Traditionally, at the end of High School, students have to choose between two paths: the State 
Universities and the Higher Education’s Schools (Grandes écoles). The Universities 
education path is a quasi no-charge system whatever the subject area chosen by the student. 
The higher education’s School path is a two steps path. The first step consists of two years in 
a Preparatory class to higher education Schools (Classe préparatoire aux grandes écoles) 
which is subsidized by the State and free from charges. The second step is a three years’ step 
in a Higher Education School. For this second step the choice of the student subject area has 
financial consequences: Engineering Schools are subsidized by the State, whereas Business 
Schools are not largely subsidized and charge their students with high fees. Aside these two 
traditional main paths, there is some other specific diplomas: the Higher Technician 
Certificated (Brevet de Technician du Supérieur) diploma is prepared in two years in specific 
schools, whereas the University Institute of Techno logy Diploma (Diplôme Universitaire de 
Technologie) and the Scientific and Technological University Diploma (Diplôme d’Etude 
Universitaire Scientifique et Technique) are two years specialized diplomas prepared in some 
Universities.  
The amount of public spending for a student is thus in France strongly related to her higher 
education path.  These differences stem mainly from staff spending: Preparatory Classes and 
higher education Schools are mainly based on small classes’ pedagogy, whereas University’s 
courses are mainly done in amphitheatres.   
Few statistics are available on diploma’s real cost in France. The table 1 gives an idea of the 
different costs of higher education paths corresponding to the part of the cost subsidized by 
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the State. The costs presented in this table are an evaluation based on the Zuber (2004) results, 
with some additional hypotheses concerning University cost for a year. We assume that all 
students follow the cheapest courses, for instance Law and Economics courses for a two years 
university degree. Following the Zuber (2004) results, we cannot present differentiated costs 
between the University diplomas; however these costs are probably higher for the University 
Institute of Technology Diploma (DUT) and the Scientific and Technological University 
Diploma (DEUST) than those of the regular University first degree (DEUG).  
 
Table 1. Subsidized Higher Education Costs according to Education Path    
Part of the 
1970's 
generation
Public Higher Education Costs in € (2005)
No Higher Education Diploma 67.8% 0
Two years graduates 15.4% 13,298
DEUG (University) 1.5% 4,905
DUT/DEUST (University) 2.0% 4,905
BTS 8.9% 18,491
Other Higher Technician Diploma 0.6% 18,491
Paramedical Diploma 2.3% 4,764
Three years graduates 5.6% 14,072
Licence (University) 3.9% 8,486
Others three year graduates 1.6% 27,737
Four years graduates 3.9% 12,066
Master (University) 3.9% 12,066
Five years graduates 6.0% 32,709
DEA (University) 1.2% 17,805
DESS (University) 1.9% 17,805
Business Schools 0.9% 25,391
Engineering Schools 1.6% 58,838
Most 'prestigious' Engineering Schools 0.4% 127,527
More than five years graduates 1.4% 75,768
PhD (Medical Degree excluded) 0.7% 35,021
PhD (Medical Degree) 0.7% 113,892
Total 100% 6,288
 
Source: Zuber (2004), French Labour Force Survey 1990-2005 (Insee) – author’s calculation. 
 
 
Differences in individual higher education costs stem from the number of years of education, 
the education path and the major.The cost of an additional year of higher education differs 
greatly according to the education path. The average cost per year for a two years University 
diploma is 2,453 euros, whereas the average cost per year for an Engineering School diploma 
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is near five times higher. When we consider also the years in Preparatory schools, the total 
cost of an Engineering School diploma is twelve times larger. This difference is only partially 
explained by the increasing cost of a year of higher education with the level of education.  
When one considers the same level of education, Engineering School costs are more than 
three times higher than the same level University degree. When one considers the most 
‘prestigious’ Engineering School which represent around 1.9% of the total engineer degrees, 
the subsidized cost is more than sixteen time higher than a five years’ University degree. 
One can argue that these cost differences could be explained by the fact that scientific courses 
which constitute the main part of Engineering School curriculum are more costly. As shown 
in the previous section, implementing an ICL with a difference in tuition fees by major is not 
consistent with the Lisbon Strategy. However, according to Zuber (2004) evaluations, the 
differences in costs still remain. If one only considers the scientific major at University,  
Engineering Schools remain one and a half more costly. Moreover the cost gap between the 
most famous Engineering Schools and the other five years degree remains.  
To conclude, French higher education system is characterized by education paths which differ 
by their selectivity and the costs paid by the State. Insofar as this higher education impacts 
individual careers, charging the diploma according to their collective cost could introduce 
more equity. Considering the implementation of an ICL scheme consistent with the Lisbon 
Strategy, the great diversity of degree cost goes beyond the traditional differences between 
scientific and other major fields of education. In France, this is mainly due to the diversity of 
higher education paths.  
  
3. Analysing Higher Education Output over the Life course with a dynamic 
microsimulation model 
According to the traditional approach in education economics, education can be considered as 
a part of human capital which impacts earnings over the life course. The gains of this 
investment can be assessed by computing the individual internal rate of return of one 
additional year of education. Since the seminal Mincer (1974), measuring internal rate of 
return to education has become an important dimension of the analysis of education choices, 
which put the stress on controlling endogeneity -Heckman et al (2006). A complementary 
approach, still under developed in education economics, is the dynamic microsimulation 
method which aims at taking into account the complexity of national socio-fiscal regimes – 
for instance, Harding (1993), Mitton et al. (2000). These methods lead to the computation and 
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the analysis of ex post internal rate of return to education. They simulate the diversity of 
career in a given tax and transfer regime: basically, the micro-units are considered one year 
older each new step of the simulation. This ageing process affects the probability of changing 
labour market position, wages and the corresponding taxes and transfers. Considering 
education economics, the advantage of a dynamic microsimulation approach is to include in 
the calculation of the internal rate of education the whole tax and benefit system: for instance, 
a more complete calculation of education internal rate can be produced if pension schemes 
and more generally the last part of the life course are taken into account. As other empirical 
micro approaches, microsimulation enables an analysis of the distribution of individual 
internal rates of return to education for a given diploma. 
To evaluate the distribution of internal rate of return to higher education, we have to produce 
individual chronicles of incomes and taxes based on diploma characteristics. Harding (1995) 
analyses the ICL implementation in Australia on the basis of a ‘general’ dynamic 
microsimulation model which produces no specific results concerning education output. Her 
main focus is the forecast of the percentage of individuals who will pay back their loan and 
the differences between male and female considering this point. Vandenberghe and Debande 
(2007) produce a comparative microsimulation analysis of ICL schemes implementation for 
three countries –Belgium, Germany and United-Kingdom-; however, they also retained a very 
aggregated variable for higher education diplomas. As shown in the previous section, when 
one considers higher education costs, this level of aggregation is not sufficient to assess 
particular cases like France. 
 A dynamic microsimulation model can be defined by the data it uses and the integrated 
ageing process.  
We simulate the life course of 34,643 individuals who represent the ind ividuals born in 1970 
–around 850,000 persons- in terms of sex, diploma and entering labour force’s ages. The  
relative percentage of each case is approximated on the basis of the French Labour Force 
Survey (FLFS) 2003-2005 considering the persons born in the 1968-1972 period. Actually, 
the real cost of teaching differs greatly between Engineering schools according to their 
‘prestige’ e.g. their rank in the French higher education system -for more details see Zuber 
(2004). We decided to take into account this differentiation between Engineering Schools.  
Because classification in the French Labour Force Survey 2003-2005 (FLFS) doesn’t allow 
the statistician to distinguish those who got their degree from a Prestigious Engineering 
School  from the others, we proceed to a particular methodology explained in section 6.5 in 
order to estimate wage equations.  
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The modelled ageing process simulates the annual individual transitions between three main 
states: inactivity, employment and unemployment –for more details see section 6.2. The 
simulation begins at sixteen which is the legal age for the end of compulsory schooling. A 
Mincer’s equation estimated by diploma is used to simulate the wage for individuals in 
employment position. The equations corresponding to the transition process and the wages 
simulation are estimated on the FLFS 2003-2005. Then we simulate the main features of the 
French socio-fiscal regime: unemployment benefits, retirement pensions and income tax –See 
section 6 for more details. The probability to survive is calculated until the individual is 100 –
we then assume that she dies. 
To calculate the internal rate of return at sixteen ( ir ), we need all the financial flows linked to 
an investment: the internal rate of return is the rate of actualisation which makes the sum of 











ia rF  
 
Where iaF  is the net financial flow at age (a+15).The microsimulation approach enables us to 
apprehend the financial flows by diplomas all over the life course. These flows are growth 
earnings, which mix gains from all education years including primary and secondary 
schooling. To have an appraisal of the net impact of higher education, we decided to assume 
that the net financial flows linked to higher education is the difference between the individual 
net income and the expected income for the persons without tertiary diploma of the same age. 
 
aiaiaiaiaiaia dGOTRDWF 0)( ---++=  
 
Where iaW  is the individual wage at the age (a+15), D the unemployment benefit, R the 
retirement benefit and T the individual tax (individual income tax and ICL annuity), adG 0  is 
the income flow mean at the age (a+15) of the individuals who do not have a higher education 
degree. The opportunity ( dxaiO ) costs of an individual i, with a dx diploma level are calculated 
as follows: 
 
}{ dxaadaddxai LFGLFGLFGMAXO ,...,, 10=   if aALFi <  
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Where iALF  is the age of entering the labour force of an individual i, and dxaLFG  the mean 
of the gains at age (a+15) of the individuals with the dx higher education level  who are in the 
labour force. 
Two limits of dynamic microsimulation are generally admitted: (i) the dynamic of ageing is 
sensitive to assumptions –or implicit assumptions- about the macro conditions; (ii) without 
the modelling of behavioural response, the ex ante analysis of a programme implementation 
remains a ‘morning after’ analysis and could then be misleading if implementing such a 
programme implies behaviour modification. Considering the first point, the implicit 
assumption of our model is that the situation of the 2003-2005 reflects the  wages and the 
transitions perspectives as well as their heterogeneity for the 1970’s generation. The results 
we produce could be misleading if for instance there was a technological shock which should 
modify relative transition probabilities or wages during the period we simulate. Considering 
the second point, the model describes forecast of career heterogeneity without behaviour 
adjustment to the policy implementation. In this sense, it is a comprehensive simulation of 
internal rate for higher education diversity. 
From a rational choice point of view, the evaluation of the impact of ICL implementation on 
the expected internal rate of return to higher education could be interpreted as measuring the 
potential change in incentives to complete a higher education degree: the expectation of 
internal rate of return and its variability, as well as her own qualities and aptitudes to learn are 
parts of the information set used by the student to determine her Higher educational strategy. 
If, for a given diploma, an important part of individual expected rate of return to higher 
education became negative or null with the implementation of ICL schemes, this could be 
interpreted as a potential enlargement of a low education traps. 
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4. An evaluation of ICL implementation 
This section presents the results of our simulation of different ICL schemes. It appears that in 
spite of differentiated potential impact on macro level, the ICL schemes retained here have 
small impact on rate of return to higher education diploma; moreover they do not change the 
diplomas hierarchy. In the first subsection we focus on the design of the different schemes we 
simulate and their different macro impact. In the second one, we present the result considering 
the distribution of the diplomas’ rate of return. 
 
4-1-The differences in the ICL schemes design and their macro impact 
To measure how ICL could affect return to higher education, we simulate five different 
schemes that we compare to the reference which is the estimation of return to higher 
education in the present French case. The designs of the different schemes simulated are 
synthesized in table 2.  
  
Table 2. The  ICL schemes simulated 
Scenarios Segments of annual 
income in € 2005
Reimbursement 
Rate for the 
segment
Scenario 1 all 4%
Scenario 2 all 8%
Scenario 3 [0 ; 15,982[ 0%
[15,982 ; 21,080[ 8%
[21,080 ; 28,284[ 12%
28,284 and more 20%
Scenario 4 [0 ; 12,720[ 0%
[12,720 ; 15982[ 5%
[15,982 ; 21,080[ 10%
[21,080 ; 28,284[ 20%
28,284 and more 30%
Scenario 5 [0 ; 5,827[ 0%
[5,827 ; 11,344[ 4%
[11,344 ; 25,185[ 8%
[25,185 ; 67,546[ 12%
67,546 and more 20%
 
Source : French Fiscal administration, French Labour Force Survey 2003-2005 (Insee) –author’s calculations 
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In the two first schemes, we assume that the annual reimbursement is a fixed amount of the 
current income respectively 4% and 8%, whatever is the level of income. Insofar as there is 
no threshold of exemption to reimbursements, they do not correspond to the very ICL 
principle. These two scenarios are benchmarks, notably to evaluate the macro aspects of 
reimbursement. The scenario 3 and the scenario 4 have a design corresponding to the 
percentiles of hourly wages normalised on an annual basis. The reimbursement threshold of 
the scenario 3 is given by the median; the other thresholds of the other segments are 
respectively given by the third quartile and the 90th percentile. The reimbursement threshold 
of the scenario 4 is fixed on the first quartile; the thresholds of the others income segments are 
respectively given by the median, the third quartile and the 90th percentile. The last simulation 
is more embedded in the French tax system. The reimbursement thresholds correspond to the 
different thresholds of the French income tax. Technically the threshold of ICL’s 
reimbursement is largely below the fifth percentile of hourly wage. This means that the 
individuals who do not pay back ICL annuity are those who stay out the labour force or those 
who are without current income because of a long unemployment period.  Comparing to the 
benchmarks the reimbursement rates are lower for the lower segments of income. 
It is important to note that the different reimbursement schemes considered here differ 
significantly from the ones experimented in Australia. In Australia, when the current income 
is above the reimbursement threshold, the former student has to pay back a fixed part of her 
whole current income, whereas in the schemes we evaluate the rate of reimbursement is 
applied to the corresponding segment of the current income.  
Of course, the  different ICL schemes impacts on individuals have to be related to the financial 
resources they produce for the State. As noted earlier, the financial resources corresponding to 
a fully developed ICL scheme is only a long term goal. However, it has to be noticed that this 
amount varies according to the selected ICL scheme –see table 3. 
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Table 3. The different ICL schemes revenues (in 2005 €) 
 







Source: author’s calculations. 
Note:  to calculate the ICL schemes aggregate 
amount, we assume that the total population is 
composed of overlapping generations with the 
characteristics of the 1970’s one; the whole 
simulation of the 1970’s generation life course is 
then considered as cross-section data. 
 
Scenario 1 and scenario 2 are not income progressive, but only income proportional: fully 
developed, they lead to a flow between four and five billions euros. The amount is very 
sensitive to the reimbursement threshold. Scenario 3 fixes it at the level of the median hourly 
wage and scenario 4 at the level of the first quartile of hourly wage; this leads to a decrease of 
more than half of the outcomes compared to the benchmarks. The last scenario which is an 
income progressive version of the two first scenarios with a very low reimbursement 
threshold have a total amount more close to the benchmarks.  
Considering respectively the GDP of France and Australia and the Australian HECS revenue 
in 2004-2005 which are available in Chapman (2006b, p.81), one can argue that the ICL of 
the fourth scenario provide comparable revenues to the Australian situation. However, beyond 
these macro considerations, it is important to consider the individual level and the impact of 
such scheme on internal rate of return to higher education. 
 
4-2-The impact on the distribution of individual rates of return to higher education 
Table 4 presents the results of the simulations considering the internal rate of return to higher 
education. A first set of comments concerns the actual return to higher education in France. 
The level of return does not increase with the years of higher education completed. The two 
years graduates have a relatively high median rate (8.2%); the median rate decreases sharply 
for the three years (6.3%) and slightly for the four years graduate (6%). The five years 
graduates have rate which is close to the two years graduates whereas there is an important 
decrease median rate for the PhD (4.5%). This quite surprising result is explained by the 
heterogeneity of higher education paths exposed in section 2.2. When one considers for 
instance the regular University curriculum, the returns to higher education are not so 
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surprising: if the DEUG rate is close to the Licence rate, it is significantly lower than the 
Master rate. This trend pursues for the more applied University degree –the so called ‘DESS’- 
but it decreases for the more general University Degree –the so called ‘DEA’. 
More generally, the results concerning the completed five years or more diplomas have to be 
interpreted carefully: the relative low rates of return to University diplomas is linked to their 
relatively small part in the high wage sectors, where they compete with engineers. Similarly, 
the relative ly low rate of return to other PhD diplomas could be explained by the relatively 
small part of scientific and technical majors, which remains Engineering School’s speciality 
in French higher education system. This trend is certainly reinforced by specific career choice 
of PhD graduates, notably in the education sector, which are not well paid considering the 
level of education completed for PhD diplomas. Moreover, the PhDs’ tend to enter lately in 
the labour force; it mechanically impacts negatively the rate of return for an equivalent first 
wage. Concerning the medical PhD diplomas, we choose to not reproduce the results, because 
they are based on the estimation of wage equations whereas an important part of these persons 
engages in a self-employment career –see 6-3 for more details.   
Not surprisingly, the diplomas with the highest rates of return are those of the ‘most 
prestigious’ Engineering Schools (13%). They are followed by Business School degrees 
(10.3%). The other Engineering Schools degrees have a median rate of return equivalent to 
the rate of very specialized two years degree completed at University –the DUT and DEUST 
degrees- which do not correspond to the regular University education path: 9.8-9.9%. Some 
other very specialized two or three years degrees have also high rate of return to diploma  




Table 4.  Return to Higher Education  
Median P75/P25 Median P75/P25 Median P75/P25 Median P75/P25 Median P75/P25 Median P75/P25
Two years graduates 8.2% 2.5 7.7% 2.5 7.4% 2.4 8.2% 2.5 8.2% 2.5 7.9% 2.5
DEUG (University) 5.6% 3.3 5.3% 3.2 5.3% 3.1 5.6% 3.3 5.6% 3.3 5.4% 3.3
DUT/DEUST (University) 9.9% 2.3 9.5% 2.3 9.4% 2.3 9.9% 2.3 9.9% 2.3 9.7% 2.3
BTS 8.4% 2.5 7.8% 2.4 7.4% 2.3 8.4% 2.5 8.4% 2.4 8.1% 2.5
Other Higher Technician Diploma 5.6% 3.6 5.1% 3.7 4.9% 3.5 5.6% 3.6 5.6% 3.5 5.3% 3.7
Paramedical Diploma 8.0% 2.1 7.8% 2.2 7.7% 2.1 8.0% 2.1 8.0% 2.1 7.8% 2.1
Three years graduates 6.3% 2.5 6.0% 2.4 5.9% 2.4 6.3% 2.4 6.2% 2.4 6.1% 2.4
Licence (University) 5.6% 2.5 5.4% 2.5 5.3% 2.4 5.6% 2.5 5.6% 2.5 5.4% 2.5
Others three years graduates 8.4% 2.2 7.9% 2.3 7.6% 2.2 8.4% 2.2 8.3% 2.2 8.0% 2.2
Four years graduates 6.0% 2.2 5.7% 2.2 5.6% 2.2 6.0% 2.2 5.9% 2.2 5.8% 2.2
Master (University) 6.0% 2.2 5.7% 2.2 5.6% 2.2 6.0% 2.2 5.9% 2.2 5.8% 2.2
Five years graduates 8.4% 2.0 7.9% 2.0 7.6% 2.0 8.3% 2.0 8.2% 2.0 8.0% 2.0
DEA (University) 5.7% 2.2 5.4% 2.2 5.3% 2.1 5.6% 2.2 5.6% 2.1 5.4% 2.1
DESS (University) 7.4% 1.9 7.0% 2.0 6.8% 1.9 7.3% 2.0 7.2% 1.9 7.0% 2.0
Business Schools 10.3% 1.6 9.7% 1.6 9.3% 1.6 10.2% 1.6 10.1% 1.6 9.8% 1.6
'Normal' Engineering Schools 9.8% 1.7 9.2% 1.7 8.7% 1.7 9.7% 1.7 9.6% 1.7 9.3% 1.7
'Prestigious' Engineering Schools 13.0% 1.7 12.4% 1.7 11.8% 1.7 12.7% 1.7 12.5% 1.7 12.3% 1.7
More than five years graduates 4.5% 1.9 4.3% 1.9 4.2% 1.9 4.4% 1.9 4.4% 1.9 4.3% 1.9
PhD (Medical Degree excluded) 4.5% 1.9 4.3% 1.9 4.2% 1.9 4.4% 1.9 4.4% 1.9 4.3% 1.9
Scenario 4 Scenario 5Reference Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
Note: the simulation concerns the 1970’s generation.  
 
 
A higher rate of return is not the only output that could explain enrolment in higher education. 
Higher diplomas are expected to secure careers which could be measured by distribution 
statistics like the distance between percentiles of rate of return to diploma – the P75/P25 
columns of table 4. In this perspective, the heterogeneity of careers is reduced with the years 
of higher education completed. Generally when considering diplomas at the same level of 
education, the higher is the return the smaller is the distribution variance or interquartile 
range.     
The ICL schemes which uniformly charge a fixed amount of the current income until the debt 
is recovered have a small impact on the median rate of return to higher education. For a 
charging rate of 8% of current income (scenario 2), the maximum decrease in rate of return to 
diploma is 1.2 point. It concerns the ‘most prestigious’ Engineering School. This kind of ICL 
schemes has quasi no impacts on rates of return distribution whatever is the level of education 
or the diploma: the maximum is an increase in P75/P25 of 0.2 point for the DEUG University 
degree. 
 When one considers the ICL schemes with income-progressive reimbursement rate (scenario 
3, 4 and 5), the maximum decrease in the rate of return is 0.7 point. Like for other scenarios 
the maximum decrease concerns the ‘most prestigious’ Engineering Schools. Scenarios 1 and 
2 which have a higher reimbursement threshold than the scenario 3, do not change the median 
rate of return for two years degree and slightly decrease the return for three and four years 
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degree. Like the uniformly charged ICL schemes the progressive ICL schemes has quasi no 
impact on rates of return’s distribution.  
Noteworthy, the diplomas hierarchy remains unchanged whatever is the ICL scheme 
considered, which means that the relative financial incentives to complete a diploma will not 
be affected by the introduction of an ICL scheme. However, an ex ante evaluation of ICL 
implementation has to consider if it potentially increases low education traps. In this 
perspective, the table 5 presents the proportion of the individual rates of return to higher 
education which are negative; this means that the earnings of these persons with a tertiary 
education are inferior to the mean earnings of individuals who did not complete a higher 
education degree. From a rational point of view considering expecting gains -without 
considering the individual talents for education-, the decision to complete higher education for 
these level of degree has a very uncertain outcome.  
 
Table 5. Proportion of Negative Individual Returns to Higher Education   
Reference Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
All higher education graduates 5.7% 5.9% 5.9% 5.7% 5.7% 5.8%
Two years graduates 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
DEUG (University) 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
DUT/DEUST (University) 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
BTS 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Other Higher Technician Diploma 8% 9% 10% 8% 8% 8%
Paramedical Diploma 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Three years graduates 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Licence (University) 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Others three years graduates 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Four years graduates 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Master (University) 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Five years graduates 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
DEA (University) 4% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5%
DESS (University) 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Business Schools 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
'Normal' Engineering Schools 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
'Prestigious' Engineering Schools 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
More than five years graduates 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
PhD (Medical Degree excluded) 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
Note: the simulation concerns the 1970’s generation.  
 
A first range of comments concerns the part of individual negative return to higher education 
in the reference situation - e.g. without any ICL scheme implementation. Among the higher 
education graduates they are about 6%. There are two kinds of explanations for this situation. 
In a first hand, this negative rate could be related to career choices –entirely or partially 
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constrained by the institutional framework. For instance women could decide to complete 
higher education but will quit the labour force for child care; in doing so, their individual rate 
of return to higher education decreases, even if the welfare provided by this education choice 
is better than the choice of not completing a higher education degree. In a second hand, this 
situation could be explained by imperfect information on the hierarchy of diplomas expected 
returns and/or on student knowledge of its own ability to gain from a completed diploma on 
the labour market considering local conditions, etc.  
Insofar as the education process is long, one expects that the part of negative return to higher 
education will decrease. Our results show (table 4) that it is not verified. The two years 
degrees which have a rate close to the mean, whereas there is an increase in this rate for the 
three and four years graduates. As for the median rate of return to diploma, this can be 
explained by diplomas heterogeneity. When one considers the regular University path –e.g. 
DEUG, Licence, Master, DEA/DESS and PhD-, the proportion decreases.  
With a risk of 2-3%, Engineering Schools and Business Schools are associated with the 
smallest risk of negative return. The higher rates concern the two years graduates of the 
University regular education path which reaches 12%. More generally, the University regular 
education path’s diplomas have a relatively important part of negative returns until the master 
degree (8%). An explanation of this concentration of the risks of negative returns on the 
University path is that having a University diploma is a signal that the student has not been 
able to complete a higher degree following the regular University education path; this leads to 
a more important risk of junked career. 
The impact of ICL schemes implementation on the part of negative returns to higher 
education remains small. According to the schemes considered, it increases the global part 
from 0.1 point to 0.2 point. However, when one considers specific diplomas, the risk increase 
could be a little more important –but always below one point. The more vulnerable diplomas 




In this paper we analysed the question of implementing ICL schemes for higher education in 
the case of an institutional context characterized by a former tuition free system and a great 
heterogeneity in tertiary education diplomas quality and cost which impact the individual’s 
careers. We discuss the problem of equity in this context and argue that the principal 
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justification of ICL implementation is the development of ‘career’ equity, with a related risk: 
the creation of low education traps. Based on a microsimulation of the French case, which is 
characterized by a great heterogeneity of higher education diplomas, we show that this risk 
remains small whatever is the particular design of the ICL scheme implemented. Moreover a 
more income-progressive scheme leads to contain the progression of these low education 
traps measured by the part of negative individual rates of return to higher education. More 
generally, the tertiary education diplomas hierarchy is not affected by an ICL implementation. 
Concerning higher education policy, this paper shows that implementing ICL scheme could 
be extended to countries with complex and heterogeneous tertiary education system: it has a 
very small impact on return to higher education. This could lead to increase ‘career’ equity - in 
this view, our results complement those of Vandenberghe and Debande (2007) for a more 
extreme country case considering the heterogeneity of tertiary education’s costs. Moreover, 
the ICL implementation could lead to collect additional resources which could be invested in 
tertiary education. However, from a welfare point of view, complementary evaluations should 
be produced concerning the impact of the different ICL schemes on households’ disposable 
income over the life course to have a more complete evaluation of the implementation of this 
kind of schemes and the corresponding living standard risks.  
 
 
6-Annex: the microsimulation model 
The microsimulation model aims at simulating the individual sources of income over the ir life 
course considering the diploma they completed. In this annex, we present the architecture and 
the different hypotheses of the dynamic microsimulation model which we use in the paper.  
In a first sub-section we present the main hypotheses that are made to simulate the aggregate 
labour force participation of a given generation over its life course. These results are used in 
the model for the statistical alignment of individual transitions. In a second sub-section we 
present the main hypotheses concerning the simulation of individual transitions. In a third 
sub-section, we present the main hypotheses concerning wage simulation. In a fourth one, we 
present the way we assess the case of the ‘most prestigious’ Engineering Schools. In the last 
sub-section, we shortly describe the main features of the French socio-fiscal regime, which 
are taken into account in the model. 
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6-1-Modelling generational labour force participation and unemployment rate over the 
life course  
A first step consists of modelling the rate of labour force participation and the unemployment 
rate over the life course for a given generation. The French Labour Force Survey 1968-2005 
is used to construct segments of labour participation rate and unemployment rate according to 
age and generation. For instance, the generation born in 1950 has available data from the age 
18 to 55, the generation born in 1960 from the age 16 to 45, the generation born in 1970 from 
16 to 35, etc. The model is estimated separately for males and females; it includes different 
specifications of age, the current unemployment rate for a generation at a given age and 
generations’ dummies. The main results of the estimations are presented in table 6. 
 
Table 6. Estimation of Labour Force Participation and Unemployment Rate Models 
Male Female Male Female
Intercept -21.25 * -27.11 * 3.53 * 3.25 *
Age 1.75 * 2.74 * -0.56 * -0.43 *
Age 2 -0.04 * -0.10 * 0.01 * 0.01 *
Age 3 0.00042 * 0.00153 * -0.00010 * -0.00007 *
Age 4 -0.000002 * -0.00001 *
Curent unemployement rate -3.44 * -1.81 * 0.26 * 0.03 *
R-Square 0.97 0.92 0.82 0.82
Logistic transformation of labour 
force participation rate
Logistic  transformation of 
unemployment rate
 
Source: Labour Force Survey 1968-2005 (Insee) - author’s calculation. 
Note: taking 1970 for reference, this model is  estimated with dummies for each generation, they are not 
reproduced here; (*) for 1% level of significance. 
 
 
The figures 1 and 2 present the results that are used in the simulation. They represent the rate 
of labour force participation and the unemployment rates over the life course, which are 
simulated for the 1970’s generation. For these simulations, we assume a current 
unemployment rate at 8% which corresponds to the French unemployment rate in 2008. 
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Source: author’s calculations.  
Note: simulation is based on the hypothesis  of a current employment rate 8% for the 1970’s generation over its 
life course. 
 














Source: author’s calculations.  
Note: simulation is based on the hypothesis of current employment rate of 8% for the 1970’s generation over its 
life course. 
 
6-2-Modelling individual transitions  
In the microsimulation model, the transitions between inactivity, employment and 
unemployment are modelled. More precisely, five states are modelled: inactivity, self-
employment, employment in public sector, employment in private sector and unemployment.  
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The microsimulation of transitions over the life course replicates the same pattern for each 
year. It proceeds as follows. First, the individual probability of transition to activity is 
calculated and resolved by comparing it to a randomised variable. The resolving process 
includes a global alignment to the generation’s rates which calculation has been presented in 
the previous sub-section. Then, knowing that the individual is active, the probability of being 
self-employed is calculated and resolved. Then, knowing that the individual is active and not 
self-employed, the probability of being in employment in the public sector is calculated and 
resolved –we assume that the public sector constitutes a fixed part of employment which 
corresponds to the mean in regards of the 1968-2003’s period: 20%. Then, knowing that the 
individual is active but neither in self-employment nor in public sector, the probability of 
having a job in the private sector is calculated and resolved. The individual in unemployment 
are those who remain in an unaffected state at the end of the process. 
The individual probability of transition is calculated using binomial logit models, which are 
estimated on the French Labour Force Survey 2003-2007. The variables of the modelling 
include the former position -which explains an important part of the transition probability-, 
some variables describing the socio-economic status, and diploma. The results are presented 
in table 7. It should be noted that the socio-economic variables concerning the family’s 
position –number of children if female, young children if female- are not included in the 
microsimulation of individual transition. However they are included in the estimations to 
capture the effect of the other variables ceteris paribus. 
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Table 7. Estimation of Transition Models 
Intercept 0.261 * 2.196 * 1.434 * 2.108 *
Former position
Inactive ref -5.438 * -5.336 * -1.834 *
Unemployment 2.489 * -6.610 * -6.341 * -3.091 *
Self-Employment 5.057 * ref -5.555 * -1.834 *
Employment (public sector) 4.166 * -10.020 * ref -1.874 *
Employment (private sector) 3.794 * -8.122 * -6.326 * ref
Socio-economic status
Female -0.230 * -0.601 * 0.548 * -0.072 *
Number of Children (if female) -0.089 * 0.066 * 0.008 * -0.091 *
Young Children (if female) -1.579 * 0.126 * 0.143 * 0.101 *
Age 55 and more -1.491 *
Age 60 and more -1.373 *
Age 65 and more -0.352 *
Years of experience -0.018 * 0.040 * 0.067 * 0.045 *
Years of experience (square) -0.00003 * -0.001 * -0.001 *
Out of the Labour force duration (in years) -0.365 *
Long term unemployment -13.459 ** -16.551 *
Diploma
No Higher Education Diploma
CAP/BEP 0.354 * -0.054 * 0.553 * 0.300 *
Bac Général 0.262 * 0.359 * 0.500 * 0.337 *
Bac Professionnel 0.914 * 0.295 * 0.083 * 0.653 *
Bac Technique 0.495 * 0.056 * 0.593 * 0.451 *
Capacité en Droit (1) 0.934 * 0.163 ** -0.841 * -0.396 *
Two years graduates
DEUG (University) 0.078 * 1.036 * 0.470 * 0.124 *
DUT/DEUST (University) 0.772 * -0.285 * 0.275 * 0.848 *
BTS 0.617 * 0.471 * 0.008 ns 0.681 *
Other Higher Technician Diploma 0.068 * 0.691 * 0.110 * -0.042 *
Paramedical Diploma 0.376 * 2.421 * 3.606 * 1.121 *
Three years graduates
Licence (University) 0.139 * 0.576 * 1.212 * 0.272 *
Others three year graduates 0.739 * 0.905 * 0.302 * 0.613 *
Four years graduates
Master (University) 0.314 * 0.637 * 0.844 * 0.202 *
Five years graduates
DEA (University) 0.511 * 0.242 * 0.826 * 0.190 *
DESS (University) 0.859 * -0.112 * 0.429 * 0.391 *
Business Schools 1.164 * -0.464 * -0.626 * 0.529 *
Enginering Schools 0.827 * 0.671 * 0.151 * 0.634 *
More than five years graduates
PhD (Medical Degree excluded) 0.935 * 0.344 * 1.362 * 0.422 *
PhD (Medical Degree) 0.694 * 0.796 * 3.223 * 1.205 *
Sommers' D 0.955 0.958 0.911 0.72
P. Conc. 97.7 97.6 95.2 85.6
P. Disc. 2.2 1.9 4.2 13.5
P. Tied 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.9










Source: French Labour Force Survey 2003-2005 (Insee) – author’s calculations. 
Note: (*) for 1% and (**) for 5% level of significance. (1) Capacité en droit is a university law degree which do 
not imply to previously succeed in Bac degree, it concerns almost 0.7% of the 1970’s generation.  
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 6-3-Modelling wages 
To model wages, we estimate separately Mincer’s earnings equations by diplomas. Hourly 
wages -as available in the FLFS 2003-2005- is the explained variable. The model aims at 
capturing differentiated wage profiles over the career considering diplomas; the traditional 
experience effect is then estimated by diploma. The model includes additional variables to 
estimate the ‘real specific’ effect of diploma on earnings over the career. Because of this role, 
limited to control, some of these variables are not included in the simulation of wages: 
 
-To capture a potential generation effect we control by the part of unemployment 
among young people –under 25 years- at the age of entering the labour force. This 
estimated effect is included in the wage simulation. To simulate wages we assume that 
this rate is constant over the period we simulate (8%). 
-To capture the career effect for women, we control the wage equation by a dummy. 
However this effect is not included in the simulations. We assume that the gender 
differences in the generation aggregate rate of labour force participation and 
unemployment rate that are introduced in the microsimulation already simulate the 
specificity of women careers in our model.  
-To capture the specificity of civil servant’s wage careers, a dummy is included in the 
estimation which is also used for the wage simulation. 
-To capture sector wage specificities, a set of dummies is introduced in the estimation. 
For the wage simulation, we assume that an individual makes her whole career in the 
same sector. This sector is imputed randomly based on the observed repartition in the 
FLFS 2003-2005 of the different diplomas in the different economic sectors. 
-The working time is introduced to control. For the simulations, we fixed the working 
time arbitrarily to 150 hours per month which suppose that all jobs are full- time jobs. 
  
Because of a small number of observations for some diplomas, we decided to pool some 
diplomas for estimations and to capture the specific effect of a given diploma by a dummy. 
The pooling process is based on the proximity of diplomas regarding their situation in the 
labour market based on data analysis. When the results of the data analysis are not sufficient, 
the pooling process is based on the proximity of diplomas considering their higher education 
level. Finally, eight earning equations are estimated with six equations concerning higher 
education diplomas. The results of the estimations are reported in table 8. 
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 The individual residuals corresponding to the estimations are stocked and used during the 
simulation process. Based on a random process, the microsimulation gives each simulated 
individual an observed residual according to the earning equation he is related considering its 
diploma. During the dynamic simulation process, the residual is conserved until the individual 
leaves employment; when he finds a new job, a new residual is then randomly matched. 
Unfortunately, data concerning earnings of self-employment in the FLFS are not available. In 
the simulation we decided to impute wages as a proxy of self-employment earnings. 
 
Table 8. Estimation of Earning Equations by Diploma  
Intercept 2.2 * 2.3 * 2.2 * 2.2 * 2.1 * 2.7 * 2.6 * 3.0 *
Years of experience 0.012 * 0.030 * 0.020 * 0.030 * 0.026 * 0.037 * 0.040 * 0.055 *
Years of experience (square) -0.0001 * -0.0005 * -0.0001 * -0.0002 ns -0.0003 * -0.0005 * -0.0006 * -0.0010 *
Female -0.14 * -0.12 * -0.14 * -0.16 * -0.11 * -0.13 * -0.12 * -0.16 *
Civil Servant 0.18 * 0.05 ** 0.13 * 0.05 ** 0.07 * 0.17 * 0.01 ns 0.13 *
Number of hours (per month) -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.002 * -0.001 * -0.003 * -0.001 * -0.003 *
Young unemployment rate -0.08 ns -1.54 * -0.04 ns 1.27 ns 0.90 * 0.04 n s 0.19 ns -1.85 *
Economic sector
Manufactures and construction 0.003 ns 0.030 ** 0.007 ns 0.037 ** 0.033 * 0.025 n s 0.110 * 0.026 n s
Energy sector 0.254 * 0.195 * 0.230 * 0.082 * 0.166 * 0.198 * 0.201 * 0.150 *
Finance sector 0.117 * 0.090 * 0.063 * 0.081 * 0.063 * 0.080 * 0.071 * 0.051 n s
Services for firms -0.025 * -0.018 ns -0.015 ** 0.039 * 0.004 ns 0.029 * * 0.041 * 0.034 ***
Services for consumers -0.166 * -0.122 * -0.145 * -0.114 * -0.181 * -0.152 * -0.253 * -0.140 *
Administration -0.134 * -0.100 * -0.078 * -0.070 * -0.058 * -0.095 * -0.086 * -0.242 *
Other sectors -0.049 * -0.074 * -0.063 * -0.055 * -0.028 * -0.086 * -0.084 * 0.120 *
Diploma
No higer education diploma




Technical Bac -0.04 *
Capacité en Droit (3) -0.10 **
Higher education diploma
DEUG (University) 0.10 *
DUT/DEUST (University)
BTS ref.
Other Higher Technician Diploma 0.00 ns
Paramedical Diploma 0.17 *
Licence (University) -0.08 *
Other Three Years Graduate 0.13 *
Master (University) ref.
DEA (University) -0.01 ns
DESS (University) ref.
Business School 0.07 *
Engineering School
PhD (Medical Degree excluded) 0.06 *
PHhD (Medical Degree) 0.29 *

























Source: French Labour Force Survey 2003-2005 (Insee) – author’s calculation. 
Note: (*) for 1% and (**) for 5% level of significance; (ns) for no significance. (1) The intercept presented here is not used in this form in the 
simulations cf.6-4; (2) Capacité en droit is a university law degree which do not imply to previously succeed in Bac degree, it concerns 






6-4-The case of ‘prestigious ’ Engineering Schools 
In the FLFS 2003-2005 there is no data concerning the ‘most prestigious’ Schools of the 
French higher education system. However, for the FLFS 1990-2003 it is possible to identify 
some individuals with a degree from the ‘most prestigious’ Higher Education Schools. It is an 
ad hoc classification some classes of which mixes engineers, but also some Law Schools, and 
High Administration Schools, etc. –for a description of this class, see for instance Albouy and  
Wanecq (2003). When one estimates on the FLFS 1990-2002 a wage equation with the 
specification exposed in section 6.3 , in a first hand for the ‘most prestigious’ Schools and in a 
second hand for this schools and the other Engineering Schools, one could note that 1) the 
main difference concerns the intercept of the equation which is higher for the ‘most 
prestigious’ schools (table 9), and that the coefficients are not directly comparable with those 
of the equation estimated on the FLFS 2003-2005 -this could be due to a major change in data 
collection in 2003.  
It is possible to estimate a wage equation for the ‘most prestigious’ Engineering School for 
the 2003-2005’s period, making the following assumptions: 1) the ‘most prestigious’ 
Engineering Schools do not differ from the ‘most prestigious’ Higher Education Schools 
category considering the coefficients estimated in the wage equation; 2) only the level of the 
intercept differs between coefficients of the wage equation when one considers the engineers 
graduated from the ‘most prestigious’ Schools and the other engineers; 3) the proportion 
between the intercepts is the same whatever the period considered. The level of the intercept 
used in the simulation depending on the engineer’s type is presented in the table 9. 
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Table 9. Estimation of Earning functions for different types of engineers 
Intercept used in the simulations 3.01 (1) 3.20 (3) 2.97 (3)
Estimation of wage equation on FLFS 1990-2002
Intercept 2.63 * 2.79 * 2.59 (2)
Years of experience 0.051 * 0.050 *
Years of experience (square) -0.0009 * -0.0007 *
Female -0.15 * -0.15 *
Civil servant 0.04 * -0.04837 ns
Number of hours (per month) -0.002 * -0.009 *
Youth unemployment rate 0.25 ns 0.69 ns
Economic sector
Manufactures and construction 0.047 * -0.009 ns
Energy sector 0.142 * 0.164 *
Finance sector 0.128 * 0.120 *
Services for firms 0.026 * -0.017 ns
Services for consumers -0.220 * -0.185 *
Administration -0.115 * -0.106 *















Source: French Labour Force Survey 1990-2002 (Insee) – author’s calculation. 
Note: (*) for 1% and  (ns) for no significance. (1) This intercept correspond to the one which is presented in the table 8, last column, (2) this 
intercept could be computed from the two others intercept and the probability of being from a prestigious school (19.9%), (3) this intercept is 
computed from the intercept estimated with the FLFS 1990-2002 and from the intercept for engineers’ wage equation whatever the type is 
estimated with the FLFS 2003-2005. 
 
After determining the way to simulate the engineers’ wage according to their type, it is 
important to determine the very type of the engineers in our simulations. With our input data 
constituted with the FLFS 2003-2005, it is not possible to know the real type of the engineers. 
We decided to duplicate each engineer observation (one for the ‘most prestigious’ Schools, 
one for the others) and to modify their weight according to their individual probability of 
being of one particular type. The individual probability is estimated as follows. First, we 
simulate a wage for the individual: 
 
iii uXY += b  
 
Where iY  is the log of the wage simulated, b  the coefficients of the engineer wage equation 
presented in table 8, iX  the individual characteristics and iu  a residual drawn from the 
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residual pool obtained with the estimation of the engineer wage equation using FLFS 2003-
2005 data. The conditional probability of being graduated from a ‘most prestigious’ 
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where 1s  is standard deviation of engineers’ wage graduated from the  ‘most prestigious’ 
School which is computed using the FLFS 1990-2002, and 1b  corresponds to coefficients of 
the wage equation retained for the engineers graduated from the most ‘prestigious’ School.  
The conditional probability for an engineer to be graduated from another School can then be 



























p   
 
where 2s  is standard deviation of engineers’ wage graduated from a ‘normal’ School (which 
is computed using the FLFS 1990-2002), and 2b  corresponds to coefficients of the wage 
equation retained for the engineers graduated from a ‘normal’ School. If we assume that the 
statistical structure of the population is the same and that the proportion of engineers 
stemming from the ‘most prestigious School’ is the same for the two periods ( PESP ), we can 
compute an estimation of an individual probability of being graduated from one of the ‘most 














This probability is weighted with a coefficient to align the proportion of individuals with a 




6-5-Modelling the French socio-fiscal regime 
The microsimulation takes into account the main features of the French socio-fiscal regime: 
the unemployment allocation, the retirement pensions and the income tax. According to the 
French social legislation, the calculation of workers’ rights for unemployment benefit and 
retirement pensions is linked to growth wages (salaire brut) which is not available in the 
FLFS. We assume that the growth wage constitutes a fixed part (120%) of the net wage which 
is available in FLFS. 
 The regular unemployment allowance is simulated: the Allocation d’aide au retour à l’emploi 
(ARE). Considering their past wages and their employment duration, the amount of the 
allowance is calculated for the individuals who become unemployed. 
The three main parts of the pension system are simulated. The basic pension is calculated 
based on the best 25 years which are simulated. The complementary pensions which differ 
according to the status are also calculated. The upper white collars (cadres) have a specific 
scheme. We assume that the individual with a five years higher education degree or more are 
‘cadre’. The complementary pensions are based on payroll taxes actually paid over the career. 
The civil servants’ regime is also simulated, it concerns individuals who have worked more 
than 41 years in the public sector; their pension corresponds to a fixed part of their last wage. 
The French income tax is not based on individuals but on a particular definition of a 
household. Theoretically, the tax amount varies considering the number of persons (including 
children) who compose this ‘fiscal household’.  In our simulation, we assume that the 





The estimations used for microsimulation in this paper are made on three sets of data: the 
French Labour Force Survey for 2003-2005 which is available online (http://www.insee.fr), 
the French Labour Force Survey 1968-2002 which is available for researchers from the 
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Quetelet Centre (http://www.centre.quetelet.cnrs.fr/), and the survival rate and the ir forecast 
based on Vallin and Meslé (2001) and Robert-Bobée (2006). The model used for the 
simulations is developed at EDHEC’s Economics Research Centre; the author received 
helpful contributions and comments from Stéphane Gregoir and Dede Houeto. The author 
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